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604 GOODRICH 'IJ. IND. Acc. COM. [22 C.2d 
discharged from their employment, we cannot concur in the 
view that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the compensation 
specified in the contract of employment. When an attorney 
employed under a contingent fee contract is discharged with-
out cause, he should be entitled to recover the reasonable value 
of the services performed by him prior to his discharge. (See 
concurring opinion in Salopek v. Sckoemann, 20 Cal.2d 150, 
156 [124 P.2d 21]; Oole v. Myer.s, 128 Conn. 223 [21 A.2d 
396, 136 A.L.R. 226] ; Hubbard v. Goffinett, 253 Ky .. 779 [70 
S.W.2d 671] ; Pye v. Diebold, 204 Minn. 319 [283 N.W. 487] ; 
Martin v. Oamp, 219 N.Y. 170 [14 N.E. 46, L.R.A. 1917F 
402] ; Oa'IJers v. Old Nat. Bank & Union Trust 00., i66 Wash. 
449 [7 P.2d 23] ; see also cases in 136 A.t.R. 254.) He should 
not be permitted to recover the fee fixed in the contract, 
however, for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion in 
Salopek v. Sckoemann, supra. The present case was tried and 
submitted to the jury upon the theory that the proper measure 
of damages for breach of an employment contract of this nature 
is the compensation fixed by the terms of the contract. In our 
opinion, there should be a retrial ofthe issue of damages for that 
reason. While it is true that the verdict does not award' plain-
tiffs a sum commensurate with that provided for in the contract, 
it is impossible to determine how the jury arrived at its verdict 
in view of the theory upon which the case was tried. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied Septem-
ber 1, 1943. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., 
voted for a rehearing . 
[L. A. No. 18601. In Bank. Aug. 3, 1943.] 
RUBY IDELE GOODRICH et aI., Petitioners, v. INDUS-
TRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Acts Per-
sonal to Employee-Acts Off Employer's Premises.-Acts of an 
[1J See 27 Cal.Jur. 359. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 86; [2] 
Workmen's Compensation, § 99; [3] Workmen's Compensation, 
§72; [4,5,7] Workmen's Compensation, §219; [6] Workmen's 
Compensation, § 212. 
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employee for his personal convenience, comfort or wellare do 
not necessarily take him out ·of the course of his employment, 
even though done away from the employer's premises. 
[2] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Going to and Coming from Work 
-Acts for Mutual Benefit of Employer and Employee.-A. 
fatal injury sustained by a drilling superintendent while on 
.his way home to inform his wife that he would. work at the 
. oil well throughout the night occurred in and arose out of tho 
course of the employment, where, the. superintendent had no 
regular hours and exercised considerable discretion in the pe~ 
formance of his duties, where he transacted some of his em-
ployer's business from his home and used his telephone there 
for that purpose, where on this occasion his employer, although 
suggesting that he telephone his wife from the office, did .not 
forbid him to return home, and where several witnesses stated 
that he was going home to telephone with regard to tho de-
livery of a cutting tool which was required before work could 
proceed. ..
[3] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Arising Out of Employment.-In 
vie,v of the policy of liberal construction of thoworkmen'a 
compensation laws, any reasonable doubt as to whether an em-
ployee's nct is contemplated by the employment should be re-
solvod in his favor. 
[4] Id. - Proceedings-Rehearing-Second Rehearing.-:-Generally, 
if a party docs not prevail on the original he8.ring before the 
Industrial Accident Commission and his petition for a rehear-
ing is denied, he may not again petition for a rehearing. He 
must seek relief in the courts. (See Lab. Code, § 5950.) 
[5] Id.-Proceedings - Rehearing - Second Rehearing.-If one 
party prevails on the original hearing before the Industrial 
Accident Commission and on rehearing the other party pre-
vails, the first party may petition for rehearing of tho order 
made on rehearing because he has for the first time become the 
aggrieved party under Lab. Code, § 5900, although it may be 
that such petition is not a condition precedent to court review. 
[6] Id.-Proceedings-Rehearing-Orders Affected.-An applica-
tion for rehearing may be made from an order denying relief 
under Lab. Code, § 5803, because it' is a final order of the In-
dustrial Accident Commission in which the petitioner is ag-
grieved. 
[7] Id.-Proceedings-Rehearing~Second Rehearing-Newly Dis-
covered Evidenee.-The Industrial Accident Commission may 
entertain a petition for rehearing after making an order re-
I' I, . 
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opening a case and receiving and considering new evidence, 
which petition for rehearing is preflented by the party upon 
whose petition the matter was reopened and further. evidence 
taken, but comes to the same conclusion as originally reached. 
The commission has the power to entertain such a petition be-
cause it considered new and additional evidence, the decision 
therein is in effect a new decision on new facts, and the party 
although failing to prevail on the last occasion as he had on 
the first is entitled ,to a reconsideration by the commission of 
its opinion on the new evidence. . 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Ac-
cident Commission denying compensation for death of an em-
ployee. Order annulled. 
Harold A. McCabe for Petitioners. 
Everett A. Corten, J. Gould, Fred G. Goldsworthy, J. L. 
Kearney and Herbert S. McCartney for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Petitioners, dependents of Claude E. Good-
rich, deceased, seek annullment of an order of the Industrial 
Accident Commission denying compensation for his death as 
the result of an injury which they assert arose out of and 
occurred in the course of his employment. 
Goodrich was employed on a monthly basis by the H. L. 
Whiston Drilling Company, engaged in drilling oil wells, as 
drilling superintendent. The commission found that drilling 
operations of the employer were being conducted at a place 
six-tenths of a mile from the employer's office and one and 
seven-tenths miles in the same direction from Goodrich's 
home; that Goodrich had no regular hours of duty and was 
subject to call at all hours of the day and night; that Good-
rich "earried on much of the business of the employer from 
said employee's home by mee,ns of the telephone there lo-
cated, " and he was authorized by the employer in the dis-
cretion of the employee to conduct the employer's business at 
"any place where the same could be conveniently conducted 
dnd was authorized to conduct the business of said employer 
from and at either the office of said employer or the home of 
said employee among other places"; that there was a tele-
phone in the office; that at the time of the injury to Goodrich 
which resulted in his death he "was on his way from said oil 
well to his said home, having proceeded past said employer's 
office enroute. Said employee's sole purpose in said journey 
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was to inform his wife of the probability that he would work 
at said oil well throughout the night and it was said em-
ployee's intention at said time and place after completing 
said errand to return to said oil well." 
Goodrich left his home about 7 p. m. the day of the injury 
in the car furnished by his employer to go to the above-men-
tioned place of work on a "fishing" job, stating to his wIfe 
that he would possibly be gone all night and that she should 
not worry. The work in progress r'equired the removal of a 
casing from the well being drilled. A cutting tool for that 
purpose had been ordered' between 7 and 8 p.m., and was 
supposed to arrive at the well in one to one and one-half hours. 
Goodrich had remained at the office of Owens, the man from 
whom the tool was ordered, for about one and one-half hours 
waitillg for it. When he left for the well it was understood 
that Owens would bring the tool there when it arrived. 
Shortly before 10 p. m. Goodrich and the workmen under him 
were waiting at the well for the tool to arrive. Mr. Gieck, 
who was observing the operations, testified that Goodrich said 
he wished to go home and inform his wife that he would be 
working all night; that he did not want to telephone her as it 
would frighten her and awaken his minor child who had had a 
tooth pulled. The night was cold and Gieck, haviug a heater 
in his car, offered to take Goodrich home. His offer was ac· 
cepted and they proceeded directly toward Goodrich's home. 
About a half a block therefrom the accident occurred which. 
re."lulted in the' death of Goodrich. ' . 
The employer, who was at the well shortly before 10 p.lit., 
testified that Goodrich said to him that he was goillghomc fc,>r 
the above-mentioned purpose and expected to be, back by th~ 
time the tool arrived. To the employer's suggestion that be-
cause of thc cold weather GMdrich go to the office' and wa;ii 
for the cutting' tool and telephone his wife from there,Good. 
rich made no reply. Several of the employees at the w:ell in 
Goodrich's charge testified that when he left he said be was 
going to telephone to asccrtain why the tool had not arrived. 
Goodrich had no regular hours, came nnd went as he pleased 
and excrcised considerable discretion in the performance of 
his duties. He transacted some of bis employer's business 
from bis home and use!l his telephone there for that purpose. 
[1] There are mallY act') of an employe~ for his personal . 
·' j 
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convenience, comfort or welfare, the doing of which do not 
necessarily take him out of the course of his employment, 
even though done away from the premises of the employer. 
(California Cas. Ind. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 21 Cal. 
2d 751 [135 P.2d 158].) Various instances of that character 
have been considered by the appellate courts: Drinking wine 
because of indispoSition (Elliott v. Industrial Acc. Com., 21 
Cal.2d 281 [131 P.2d 521] ; smoking (Whiting-Mead Com. 00. 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 178 Cal. 505 [173 P. 1105, 5 A.L.R. 
1518]) ; going to obtain a slicker to wear in the performance 
of his duty (Western Pacific R. R. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 
193 Cal. 413 [224 P. 754] ) ; going to obtain an overcoat (Lef-
fert, v. Industrial Acc. Com., 219 Cal. 710 [28 P.2d 911]) ; 
going into a hallway to obtain fresh air (F. W. Woolworth Co. 
v. Industrial Acc. Com., 17 Cal.2d 634 [111 P.2d 313]) ; go-
ing to obtain water for a fellow employee who had fainted 
(County of Los Angeles v. Industrial Acc. Com., 89 Cal.App. 
736 [265 P. 362]) ; returning from purchasing a package of 
cigarettes for employee's own use (Western Pipe etc. Co. v. 
Industrial Acc. Com., 49 Cal.App.2d 108 [121P.2d 35]); 
domestic servant sewing a hem on her dress (Employers' etc. 
Corp. v. Industria,l Acc. Com., 37 Cal.App.2d 567 [99 P.2d 
1089]). 
It has been said that even though an employee may be go-
ing to or from his place of employment on a mission personal 
to himself if he is also on a substantial mission of his em-
ployer which is the major factor in the movement, he may 
still be said to be within the C011rse of his employment. 
(Western States Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bayside Lumber Co., 182 
Cal. 140 [187 P. 735] ; Ocean A. & G. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. 
Com., 132 Cal.App. 207 [22 P.2d 537] ; Gagnebin v. Indus-
trial Acc. Com., 140 Cal.App. 80 [34 P.2d 1052] ; Fenton v. 
Industrial Acc. Com., 44 Cal.App.2d 379 [112 P.2d 763].) 
[2] If it be assumed that the instant case does npt fall 
strictly within either one of the foregoing rules, when they 
are considered together in light of the facts, established, it is 
clear that. the death occurred in and arose out of the course 
of employment. Goodrich was on call twenty-four hours a day. 
He held a position where he exercised considerable discretion 
in the performance of his duties. He conducted some of the 
. business of his employer from his home, using the telephone 
there' and was reimbursed for long distance calls. Working 
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at night on the occasion i~ question,. it was to b~antici~~t~~ 
that he might return to hm home which 'Was oru! a s~ort ~ 
tance away to advise his wife that he was going. to wo~k'~ 
night, although he had previously adviscdher tha.t heprob-, 
ably would be so engaged. Althoughhis.empIQyer,sJlggested,~e 
telephone his wife from the office,. he dId notfo;bld' Goodnch , 
to return home to speak to his WIfe. Several WItnesses stated 
that Goodrich said he was going home to telephone'with r~gard 
to the delivery of the cutting tool which wasrequiredhe,fol"~ 
work could proceed. The making of such a call~oul~ b~in 
the line of his duty, and the mere fact that he ~hO'Se hIS home 
from' which to call rather than the office was' not' an 'act in 
excess of his'discretion in the matter. True, his empl6,yer and. 
Gieck testified that Goodrich said he wasreturnhlg ,home to ' 
advise his wife concerning the time he would'beWaway. 'b'tit 
that did not exclude the other purpose 6f telephoning inre-
gard to the, cutting tool. , The trip had dual purPoses.' It cann(rt 
be doubted that if under the circumstances he had, been re-
turning home because operations were completed, the injury 
would have arisen out of and occurred in the course of em-
ployment; (See State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial 
Acc,. Com., 89 Cal.App. 197 [264 P. 514] ; California Casualty 
lndem. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 5 Ca1.2d 185 [53 P.2d 
758].) It was anticipated that Goodrich would be traveling 
~n the streets in an automobile inasmuch as he continuously 
ilid that in the course of his duties and the employer fur-
nished hhn a car which he kept at his home. The fact that he 
was riding in Gieck's car at· the time is immaterial inasmuch 
as his duties included the use of automobile transportation. 
We conclude therefore· that the only. reasonable inference 
flowing from the evidence is that Goodrich's death aro~e out 
of and occurred in the course of his employment. [3] ThlS con .. 
elusion must follow in light of the rule that any reasonable: 
doubt as to whether the act of the employee is contemplated 
by the employment should be resolved in favor of the '~m­
ployee in view of the policy of liberal construction of the 
workmen's compensation laws. (Employers' etc. ·Corp. v. In-
dustrial Acc. Com., 37 Cal.App.2d 567 [99 P.2d 1089].) 
Goodrich's dependents filed their' application for compen:" 
sation on November 26, 1940. A hellring was thereafter had 
resulting on March 4, 1941, in an award to them. On March 
22 C.2d-20 
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20, ·1941, the employer's insurance carrier petitioned for a 
rehearing which was granted on May 6, 1941. Apparently no 
other evidence was taken. and a decision on rehearing was 
made on May 23, 1941, determining that the death did not 
occur in or arise out of the course of employment. On Febru-
ary 13, 1942, applicants filed a petition to reopen the case on 
the grounds that the death occurred in the course of employ-
ment and to produce new evidence that the decedent had 
stated that he was going home to telephone about the cutting 
tool. That petition was denied on March 17, 1942. On April 6, 
1942, applicants filed a petition for a rehearing based upon 
the insuffic;ency of the evidence to support the order, and 
newly discovered evidence. On June 5, 1942, the commission 
granted that petition aud the matter was set for further hear-
ing. A further hearing was had at which additional evidence 
was taken. On JUly 22, 1942, applicants filed a petition for a 
further hearing to produce evidence requested by the referee. 
It was produced. On August 6, 1942, the commission made 
an order reciting that: "Rehearing having been granted 
herein, and all parties hnving appeared, and applicant hav-
ing produced and offered new and additional evidence upon. 
material issues herein, and newly-discovered evidence which 
could not with reasonable diligence have been produced and 
offered upon the original proceedings herein; and ... IT Is 
ORDERED that the above-entitled matter be and the same here-
by is reopened. 
"Applicant having petitioned for further hearing herein, 
and having made an offer to prove at said further hearing 
the facts set forth in the signed statement of Charles M. 
Owens attached to said petition for further hearing as Ex-
hibit • A', and no good cause for said further hearing appear-
ing, ... IT Is ORDERED that said signed statement of Charles 
M. Owens be and the same is hereby admitted in evidence 
herein, and said petition for further hearing dated July 22, 
194;2, be and the llame is hereby denied; and that the Order 
Denying Applicants' Petition to Reopen dated March 17, 
1942, be and the same is hereby rescinded, and the Decision 
on Rehearing dated May 23, 1941, be and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows." The amendment set forth the 
filets heretofore mentioned as found. On August 20, 1942, 
applicants petitioned for a rehearing which was denied on 
Aug. 1943] GOODRICH V. IND. Ace. COM. 
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August 27, 1942. Petition for a review was filed on September 
25, 1942. 
Respondent commission contends that it. -vyas without j~is­
diction to entertain or pass upon the petItlOn for rehearmg 
fil?rl. on August 20, 19~2; that the final decision gf tho oo~­
mISSIon was made by Its order of Aug-ust 6, 1~4.." and petI-
tioners were required to file their petition for. review in .~e 
District Court of .Appeal within :::0 days thereafter, whIch 
they failed to do. They petitioned for a rchc!tri~g and. filed 
their petition for a revicw within 30 days a!ter' Its den.I~. 
[4] Generally, if a party do(>,s not ~rcv~I1 on .the orlgmal 
hearing and his petition for a ;ehearmg IS demed, h~ m~y 
not again petition for arehearmg .. He must seek relief m 
. the courts. (See Labor Code, sec. 5950; Crowe Glass Co; v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., 84 Ca1.App. 287 [258 P. 130] ; Camp-
bell, Workmen's Compensation, vol. II, p. 1324; Harla.n v. 
Inllustrial Ace. Com., 194 Cal. 352[228 P. G54]; Musta~n v. 
Ind1tstrial Ace. Com., 130 Ca1.App. 447 [19 P.2d 1031].) 
[5] However, if one party prevails in .the original hearing and 
on rehearing the other party prevails, the first par~y may 
petition for rehearing .of t~e order made on re~earmg be-
caul:lc he has for the first tIme become the agg~leved party 
under section 5900 of the Labor Code (Dalshe~m v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., 215 Cal. 107 [8 P.2d 840], dictum; Brunau 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 135 Cal.App. 277 [26 P.2d 672]), 
though it may be that such petition is not a condition prece-
dent to court review. (Dalsheim v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
ffi~~) . 
Under the foregoing rules petitioners could have petI-
tioned for a rehearing within twenty days after the decision 
of May 23, 1941. However, rather than do that, on March 
17 1942 they filed a petition to reopen under' section 
" . . . 5803 of the Labor Code which provides: "The commlSSIon 
has continuing jurisdiction over all its orders, decisions, and, 
awards made and entered under the provisions of ,this di:vi-
sion. At any time, upon notice an~after an opportunity to 
be heard is given to the parties in interest, the· commission 
may rescind, alter, or amend any such order, decisio~, or 
award, good cause appearing therefor. , 
•• Such power includes the right to review, grant or .re-
grant, diminish, increase or terminate, within the limits pre-
scribed by this division, any compeJ?sation awarded" upon the 
grounds that the disability of the person in whose favor such 
612 GOODRICH v. bro. Acc. COM. [22 C.2d 
award was .made has either recurred, increased, diminished, 
or terminated." Their petition was denied, whereupon peti-
tionerspetitioned for a rehearing and it may fairly be said 
that such petition was for a rehearing of the denial of th(' 
petition to reopen inasmuch as in its decision on August 6, 
1942, it rescinded that order of denial. [6] Application for re-
hearing may be made . from an order denying relief under 
section 5803 because it is a final order of the commission in . 
which the petitioner is aggrieved. (See Ingram v. Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations, 208 Cal. 633, 637 [284 P. 212].) 
After granting the petition of April 6, 1942, new evidence 
consisting chiefly of the testimony of the witnesses that Good-
rich left with Gieck to telephone with regard to the clitting 
tool, was received. Thereafter, the order of August 6, 1942, 
was made amending the order of May 23, 1941, to make the 
more explicit findings heretofore set forth with respect to 
Goodrich's powers and duties, but denying compensation. 
It is true that that order of August 6, 1942, purported to 
affirm the order of May 23, 1941, but the commission could not in 
this manner deprive itself of jurisdiction to entertain a petition 
for a rehearing if it had such jurisdiction. [7] The question 
is, therefore, whether the commission may entertain a peti. 
tion for rehearing after making an order reopening a case 
and receiving and considering new evidence, which petition 
for rehearing is presented by the party upon whose petition 
the matter was reopened and further evidence taken, but 
comes to the same conclusion originally reached. It has power 
to entertain such a petition because it considered new and 
additional evidence, the decision therein is in effect a new 
decision on new facts, and the party although failing to pre-
vail on the last occasion as he had on the first is entitled to 
a reconsideration by the commission of its opinion on the 
new evidence. The very purpose of a rehearing is to have a 
reconsideration of a matter which has been theretofore con-
sidered only on one occasion. The right to have a reconsid-
eration of the· case where new facts and evidence were pro-
duced on the rehearing was not considered in Crowe Glass 
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., s~tpra. That case proceeded upon 
the theory that there would be no end to the proceedings 
before the commission if successive rehearings could be enter-
tained. Such situation does not exist where a losing party 
petitions for and obtains a rehearing on the ground. of newly 
discovtlred evidence, which evidence is produced and consid-
Aug: 1943] GooDRlcn v. IND. Acc. COM:. 
[22 C.2d 6041 
613 
ered by the commission but results in the same conclUsion. 
If the losing party again petitions for a rehearing, that is, 
a reconsideration of the evidence before the eommission, in 
a case where no new evidence is presented, and it is denied, he 
cannot again petition for a rehearing, because the commission 
in such a case is not requested to reconsider new and dif-
. ferent evidence. In Harlan v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 
the court, as pointed out in the dictum in Dalsheim v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., supra, merely held that whereon granting 
a petition for a rehearing the commission reverses itself, the 
losing party on rehearing need not petition for a re:hearing 
before seeking relief in the courts, but nevertheless, the com-
mission has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a rehear-
ing .. Beronio v. Industrial Ace. Com., 86 Cal.App .. 588 [260 
P. 1104], involved a second petition for a rehearing on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence which had not been 
mentioned in the first petition for a rehearing which was 
denied, and petitioner had sought relief in the coUrts before 
a ruling was made on his second petition for a rehearing, and 
hence the court had acquired jurisdiction. Mustain v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., supra, did not concern a situation in which 
a petition for rehearing was filed after a second denial of 
compensation on rehearing where new evidence was consid-
ered. 
The order is annulled. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. The decision of the commission 
on AUb"llst 6, 1942, which in effect reaffirmed its decision· of 
May 23, 1941, was on the rehearing granted petitioners on 
June 5, 1942. Section 5950 of the Labor Code provides, 
"Within thirty days after the petition for a rehearing is 
denied, or, if the petition is granted, within thirty days after 
the rendition of the decision on the rehearing, any l;>erson 
affected thereby may apply to the. supreme court or to the 
district court of appeal of the appellate district in which 
he resides, for a writ of review, for the purpose of inquiring 
into and determining the lawfulness of the original order, deci. 
sion or award, or of the order, decision, or award on rehear.-· 
ing." (Italics added.) Under this provision the final decision of 
the commission was made on August 6, 1942 .. (Ingram v. 
Dept. of Industrial Relations, 208 Cal. 633, 636 [284 P. 212] ; . 
Harlan v. Industrial Ace. Com., 194 Cal. 352, 365 [228P. 
fl.. !I~ I,!' 
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654] ; Crowe Glass Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 84 Cal.App. 
287, 293 [258 P. 130] ; Beronio v. Industrial Ace. Com., 86 
Cal.App. 588, 590 [260 P. 1104] ; Mustain v. Industrial Ace. 
Com., 130 Cal.App. 447, 448 [19 P.2d 1031].) The petition 
for writ of review was not filed within thirty days thereafter 
and for that reason should not be considered. (Neal v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., 36 Cal.App. 40 [171 P. 696J; North Pacific 
Steamship Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 34 Cal.App. 488 [168 
P. 30].) Since the decision on rehearing made no change in 
the award there was no basis for further reconsideration by 
the commission. (Cf. Dalsheim v. Industrial Ace. Com., 215 
Cal. 107 [8 P.2d 840] ; Brunau v. Industrial Ace. Com., 135 
Cal.App. 277 [26 P.2d 672].) 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for arehearina was denied Septem-
ber 1, 1943. Edmonds, J.,and Traynor, J., voted for a re-
hearing. 
fL. A. No. 18637. In Bank. Aug. 3,1943.] 
ELDORA HONEA, a Minor, etc., et al., Respondents, v. 
CITY DAIRY, INC. (it Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Negligence - Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur - Limitations of 
Doctrine.-The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable whrre 
a thing which causes injury is shown to be under the exclusive 
management or control of the defendant or his servants and 
the accident is. such' as in the ordinary course of things does 
not happen if those who have the management use' proper care; 
The doctrine does not apply unless the basic requisites of ex-
',.elusive control and probability of nE'gligence are proved by 
plaintiff. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Oontrol of Instrumental-
ity.-The reason for the g'en('ral requirement of the r('s ipsa 
loquitur doctrine that defendant have control of the instru-
mentality at the time of the injury is to exclude the possibility 
[1] Sec 19 Oa1.Jur. 704; 38 Am.Jur. 989. 
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 135; [2] Negligence 
§ 136; [3] Negligence, §§ 56,138; [4] Negligence, § 123; [5] NcO': 
ligence, § 56. ' c 
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[3] 
[4] 
that the accident was caused by an intervening act of pI ami iff 
or a third person, and this purpose is satisfied if plaintiff shows 
that there "as no intervening cause. In an action agaInst 'a 
dairy for injuries resulting from the breaking. of a milk bottle 
in a customer's hand, plnintiff brought herself within the rule 
by, her testimony that the bottles ddivered to her were not 
touching at any time when she had them." It would follow, 
therefore, that the brok('n bottle was defective when deliverl!d 
by the dairy.i '" 
Id.-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of'Bottle: Exer-
cise of Oare by Vendors.-The· mere breakingofa milk bottle 
.in a customer's hand cannot give risr. to the infercneethll.t the 
dairy delivering- the bottle wasnrgligent in fnilip,g!to discoycl' 
the defect. Whilll the dniry may hav!! had,n.duty;to,mak~,ari, 
examination of all bottles, whethcr, ~?~IY.'.ppr~~~se«\1 O1:!:t:e!j" 
turned by 'prior customers, it is not reSponslble' 'lor. detects, . 
that cannot be found by a rcasonable,prn:cticiibl'ein~~cti()n'.:':;, , 
. . . - ,~.l."/·':'d,'~:,.~~ .~\:;. .. ;, . ..• :··1..~l·~ ,i:,~;'!:.,. 
Id.-Evidence-Judicial NotiCe . ..,..,...Tho ,eour~i~e4~*ofl: takq;,;ju,~' 
dicial notice of the technical practices nnd.information avail.." 
able' to a bottling industry for discoveringaet~~ti~o. b'ottl~s;. 
Nor can the court take judicial notice that ~lli~s' bottics,'afe 
not ordinarily damaged or that defects' willn6't (~~ainnriifQ~':"; '. 
cur unless the bottll,r is npg'lig'l'nt, for thcsubjcc't is not· a . 
'matt!'r of common knowledg'!'.' "",'" .", . ., ,:" , 
[5] Id.-Exercise of Oare by Vendors.-A dairy"was, not~egH~·. 
grllt in delivering a defective bottle to' a customer, ,without. 
wrappin!; it, where ,therc -was no basis for an iD.fcrencc'that' , 
tlw dairy knew or should hn:\:c known that the bottle , was'dc~: , 
fective; "J 
APPEAL from a j~dgment of the Superior! Court of Los i 
Angeles County. Peirson M. Hall, Judge.;Rcversed.'. 
Action' for damages for persollal'mjti~ie~ 'r~~tIn:g f~~m",' 
a milk bottle breaking in customer's lland., JUdglnChLfor:.' 
pJitintiff reversed. ' 
HarryE. Sackett for Appellant. 
Earle M. Daniels and Julius V. Patrosso as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellant. ' 
C. V. Caldwell for Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Eldora Honea, the principal plaintiff. 
herein, a fourteen-year-old pupil at a junior high ~hool, 
